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Archaeological destruction
Emma Loosley1
ABSTRACT With the growth of the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, the world is
being forced to contemplate if there is any way we can ever comprehensively prevent cultural
heritage of international signiﬁcance falling into the hands of terrorists. The international
community also has to consider the uncomfortable truth that how we handle the current
crisis will send a clear message to the next group of extremists: Will the message be one of
strength or impotence?
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“There can be little doubt” wrote Flood in 2002 “that therecent destruction of the monumental rock-cutBuddhas at Bamiyan by the former Taliban govern-
ment of Afghanistan will deﬁne ‘Islamic iconoclasm’ in the
popular imagination for several decades to come” (641). Yet barely
a month ago in September 2015 I was driven home from a BBC
radio interview on the destruction of the Temple of Baalshamin in
Palmyra by a taxi driver who commented sadly, “It happened in
my country too. The Taliban destroyed our Buddhas”. His surprise
that I knew the story of Bamiyan was as heartbreaking as it was
ironic given the circumstances, and led me to reﬂect on the fact
that what is happening in Syria and Iraq is not a new phenomenon
and yet the media and world politicians seem to be trying to
convince us that this is in some way an unprecedented assault on
World Heritage. Why? Have we learned nothing since the events of
2001 or is it that the world was somehow irrevocably changed on
9/11 and there is no going back?
The ﬁrst answer is that yes in some respects the world has
irrevocably changed. It may be a surprise to realize that the
biggest change to impact on issues of archaeological destruc-
tion is the advent of social media. For the ﬁrst time brave
“citizen journalists” armed only with a smartphone have been
cataloguing human rights abuses and attacks on cultural
heritage as they happen and uploading the evidence to social
media proﬁles or posting videos on YouTube. There has been a
ﬂurry of social media comment1 over the ubiquity of the
smartphone among the refugees ﬂeeing to Europe over the
Summer demonstrating an alarming lack of knowledge about
life in the Middle East, notably a total ignorance of the fact
that Syria and Iraq have traditionally had large well-educated
urban middle classes who possess such items for the same
reasons that the average banker, lawyer or doctor has them
in London or Manchester …. And that is without factoring in
the advertising that means that every teenager wants to own
the latest gadget. These devices mean that for the ﬁrst time the
destruction is being reported “in real time” and the rest of
the world is being made aware of these events at least within a
day or two of the destruction occurring.
In previous conﬂicts we could only wait for the information
that the aggressor chose to share with the outside world, as with
the case of the Bamiyan Buddhas, or damage could not be
quantiﬁed or assessed at all until the hostilities ﬁnally ceased
and postwar reconstruction teams arrived on the ground. This
means that the world’s cultural heritage practitioners now ﬁnd
themselves in limbo and curiously impotent. They can watch
the destruction unfold before their very eyes on news bulletins
and IS-issued propaganda videos, but there is nothing they can
actually do to intervene and stop the destruction.2 So where do
we go from here?
One suggestion is that we stop commenting and endlessly
analysing these orgies of destruction in public. In a thoughtful
recent article on the subject, Harmanşah (2015) has suggested
that the slickly staged videos of destruction with stirring Islamic
chants in the background should be viewed more as performative
acts than a source of information to be analysed by cultural
heritage specialists:
I would like us to treat the ISIS videos not as items of archival
resource, something to be mined for objective information, but
as artifacts of ideological discourse, which will then allow us to
question their documentary status. By doing this, we can also
challenge the video’s documentary status by pointing out its
performative character. (Harmanşah, 2015: 173)
His contention is that by watching these images and
commenting on them over and over again through media
outlets we are giving IS the oxygen of publicity that will ensure
that they repeat the act. This point of view is persuasive as so
far all evidence suggests that IS are a reactive rather than a
reﬂective entity and it seems that, like a sulky small child, they
perpetrate each atrocity when interest in them begins to wane
in the hope of provoking more comment and condemnation on
the world stage.
At this point it is time to address the elephant in the room
and acknowledge that a large proportion of contemporary
discourse relating to issues of archaeological destruction is
dominated by the prevalent cultural trope of a “clash of
civilizations” and the inevitable change of the world order. The
work of Fukuyama and the response to his 1989 essay by
Huntingdon (Fukuyama, 1989; Huntingdon, 1993) in the decade
before the turn of the millennium was already facilitating a
discourse that posited some cataclysmic millennial clash when
the world was shaken by the events of 9/11. Somewhat
controversially I would argue that, apart from those who lived
through those events that day at ﬁrst hand and the families and
friends of those who survived and those who tragically did not,
those who suffered most from the fallout of that day were people
living in vast swathes of the Muslim-majority world. I phrase it
like this deliberately because I was living in a monastery in the
Syrian desert in 2001 and we did not hear what had happened
until the following day; immediately on hearing the news my
Syrian (Christian) friends began to fear this terrorist act would
be used as a provocation to attack them and, in a way, they have
been justiﬁed in this belief.
This brings me to my point; since 9/11 Islamophobia has
become almost socially acceptable in a manner that racism,
gender discrimination or homophobia is not in the Western
world. This has brought about a certain bandying around of
“facts” about Islam that are widely accepted but never properly
questioned or attributed to a deﬁnitive source. It has also led to
a de-humanization of Arabs in particular, so that people of
Arab origin are rarely viewed as being of individual national-
ities, tribe or creed, and there is certainly no acknowledgement
that not all Arabs are Muslim. Therefore the scenes currently
coming out of Syria and Iraq of archaeological destruction tend
to be dismissed with sentiments suggesting that we should
expect no better from Arabs/Muslims because, and here is the
crux of the matter, Islam forbids all ﬁgurative imagery as
idolatrous. This statement has been repeated ad nauseam and is
now accepted without question yet:
… traditional Muslim culture did not possess a doctrine
about the arts, neither formal thought-out rejections of
certain kinds of creative activities nor positive notions
about the possible instructional or beautifying values of the
various existing techniques of art. At best one can assume
that the doctrines and ways of life characteristic of early
Islam may have directed the culture toward channeling its
artistic activities in certain doctrines rather than in others.
(Grabar, 1987: 74)
Grabar, who died in 2011, is regarded as one of the greatest
scholars of Islamic art, and having spent a life studying its origins
he could state with some authority that:
… little of the literary documentation we possess is earlier
than the ninth century and by then many classical features of
the new Muslim artistic tradition had already been created.
(Grabar, 1987: 73)
In other words, there was no ﬁxed prohibition of images in
Islam in the formative centuries of the religion and it should not
COMMENT PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2015.36
2 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 1:15036 |DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2015.36 |www.palgrave-journals.com/palcomms
be forgotten that Islam was evolving at the very time that the
Christians of the Byzantine Empire were turning on their own
sacred icons (726–843); therefore early Muslims may have been
strongly inﬂuenced by the Christian rhetoric being employed to
justify the banning of sacred imagery.
What is clear is that ﬁgurative imagery in mosques was never
acceptable, suggesting that Christian iconoclasm may have had a
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on early Islamic religious art or it could have
simply been that, as with the other two monotheistic religions,
there was an uneasiness that ﬁgurative imagery could lead down a
path to idolatry. On the other hand, attitudes to ﬁgurative
imagery outside the religious sphere are far more complex and
even attitudes to sculpture were not uniformly negative in the
early years of Islam (King, 2002).
This means that it is lazy and incorrect to assert that all
Muslims are against all ﬁgurative imagery when the reality of
the situation is, as with most things in life, far more nuanced
and complex than a blanket ban. It is also wrong to assert
that this is the product of a Sunni–Shia divide. Take for
instance the Umayyad frescoes of the Qusayr ‘Amra palace/
bath house in Jordan where images of naked women bathing
and topless dancing girls gyrating to musical accompaniment
have never caused signiﬁcant offence (Fowden, 2004) versus
the comparative imagery of dancing girls and lovers that
was defaced in the music room of the ‘Ali Qapu in Isfahan
during the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979.3 The lesson is
that context is all, and the appropriateness of an image or
otherwise is what has concerned commentators, more than an
outright prohibition.
Returning to the barbarous practices of IS we need to
understand that the rise of the movement is associated with
radical changes within Islam itself and is not simply to be taken
as a merely anti-Western stance. However, as with all funda-
mentalist impulses within religion, there is a belief that the
faith in its purest form was that practiced at the time of its origins,
in this case the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad and his
followers, and there is a skewed and simplistic reading of what
that lifestyle entailed. Put simply the vast majority of radical
Islamists are ill educated as to the origins of their faith and
ignorant of the sophisticated discourse of the Middle Ages when
the Arab World led the globe in scientiﬁc and philosophical
enquiry. Apart from their holy texts they appear to be relying
on contemporary polemics by radical preachers that distort
the teachings of the great Islamic scholars of the past. This is not
to say that Islam is alone in this; Christianity is just as strongly
to blame if we take the media furore every time a “new gospel”
is “discovered” as indicative of this phenomenon. Variant
recensions of Christian texts are no secret and have been around
as long as the religion, and yet there is often a dispropor-
tionate reaction to such announcements suggesting that many
Christians are relatively untutored in the true origins of
their faith.
So where does this leave us with regard to the images we are
currently seeing of the destruction of priceless archaeological
artefacts in the media? Well ﬁrst of all we need to make clear
that they are “priceless” in the sense of what they can teach us
about our shared human past and because they are irreplace-
able. They are not priceless in the sense of being worth
vast sums of cash. Looting is undeniably a major problem
in the Middle East at the moment, but aside from the very
highest quality items most people would be surprised to learn
how little most archaeological artefacts are worth in material
terms. Toning down the hyperbole in relation to the material
worth of antiquities and being realistic about the fact that
unprovenanced items are never going to be a sound ﬁnancial
investment is perhaps the best way to derail the trade; after all
it is powered by greed and to point out that looted objects are
not valuable on an open market may be enough to deter all but
the most unashamedly amoral buyer.
More importantly perhaps we should stop dignifying these
orgies of destruction with the ﬁg leaf of religious justiﬁcation
by reporting them as an Islamic act repudiating shirk (idolatry,
polytheism). They are, as Harmanşah has perceptively pointed
out, performative acts designed to grab attention rather than
acts of religious piety. They may also be planned to cover the
tracks of their looting—if the cella of the Temple of Bel is
blown to smithereens we assume the beautifully carved reliefs
that stood at its entrance have also been destroyed, but they
could now be safely installed in a basement gallery in Jeddah,
Doha or even London.
In short this is criminal behaviour on all levels and by trying
to justify these events as a religious act by an extremist
organization we are attributing to them a signiﬁcance and ritual
justiﬁcation that is simply not justiﬁed and which is offensive in
its assumptions about Muslim culture. Cultural heritage experts
have a duty to speak out and to keep this in the public eye as, if
we allow these events to pass unremarked, it will be even easier
for the next group of depraved murderers to get away with it.
On the other hand, we must not dignify these events with a long
theological and psychological justiﬁcation for why they are
happening. Monuments are being destroyed for the same reason
that people are being brutally murdered; to shock and provoke
a reaction. In fact these two strands were recently tragically
linked with the horriﬁc murder of Khaled Al-Asad in Tadmor.
To honour his memory and that of the others like him who
have paid the ultimate price for trying to defend irreplaceable
archaeological heritage we all have a duty to speak out, but what
we must never do is glamorize or romanticize, and certainly
never seek to offer a coherent explanation for, the acts of cultural
nihilism perpetrated by IS and its ilk.
Notes
1 See http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/surprised-that-syrian-refugees-
have-smartphones-well-sorry-to-break-this-to-you-but-youre-an-idiot-10489719.
html, accessed 27 September 2015, and http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/11/how-smart
phones-are-helping-refugees-in-europe.html, accessed 27 September 2015, for just two
of the many articles that appear when the words “refugee” and “smartphone” are typed
into a search engine.
2 See the statements by the head of UNESCO Irina Bokova on http://whc.unesco.org/en/
news/1341, accessed 27 September 2015. Scrolling down to the bottom of the page will
reveal a long list of related statements condemning similar acts, all of which were
picked up by media outlets but which have failed to achieve any tangible outcome.
3 Dr Behnam Pedram, Former Dean of the Faculty of Conservation of the Art University
of Isfahan, personal communication.
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